Abstract: Despite the fact that operational risks are as old as banks, operational risk management has become one of the new challenges for bank management since they face the new capital accord (i.e., Basel II). Basel II 'opened the door' to operational risks and proposed specific rules for operational risk management, including approaches for evaluation of these risks as well as calculation the level of the required capital. Hence, this can be viewed as an 'innovative' bank risk type and, in the paper, we discuss specificities of managing of operational risks with a focus on the banking sector of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Operational risks depend on the level of market development (emerging or developed). Since they are higher in emerging markets (such as Bosnia and Herzegovina), investment in decision support systems should aim to reduce operational risks exposure.
Introduction
Although it sounds paradoxically at first, operational risks are both, the oldest and most recent threat that banks face. Banks have always had to protect themselves against the key threats to their business operations, such as robberies and internal frauds. Until some 10 years ago, which coincides to the publishing of New Capital Accord (colloquially recognised as 'Basel II'), which actually 'opened the door' to the so-called operational risk (OR), managing such threats was focused on practical techniques for minimising possible losses, whether it included using security guards at the bank branches, independence of the internal revision team or the creation of the robust IT system. Only some banks attempted to either establish the level of ORs they are exposed to or to systematically manage such risks as a special risk category.
However, influenced by Basel II, published on 26 June, 2004 by the Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), whose implementation in developed countries started on 31 December, 2006, the situation regarding banks' OR treatment changed drastically. Today, banks invest enormous energy in managing a wide spectrum of ORs at an aggregate (portfolio) level and they attempt to link ORs directly to the risk-based capital (RBC), formed for covering unexpected losses (UL).
Operational risk management (ORM) has occupied an important place on the agenda of supervisors, practitioners, academics, and the banking industry and has been on the rise because it enhances bank organisational performance and creates value for shareholders. The main objective of this paper is to highlight the relatively new phenomenon of ORs in banking, emphasise the need for their appropriate management process, and describe the whole process on a subject Bosnia and Herzegovina's (BiH) bank, as an example of domestic bank (bank with majority of domestic stakeholders) in an emerging market country. Banks are even more exposed to ORs in emerging than in developed markets, but the decision support systems for managing of ORs in emerging markets are still underdeveloped.
The paper is structured so that the first section discusses the treatment of ORs in the context of Basel II and the relevant BiH by-laws. The second section concerns the process of bank ORM. The third section gives a genuine review of previous research, and the last section gives a clear example of implementation of ORM in the example of domestic banks in BiH, which can serve as an exemplar to other small banks in countries with emerging markets.
Banks' or treatment from the point of view of BCBS and entity banking supervisory authorities in BiH

ORs in the context of Basel II
In Basel II (BCBS, 2003, p.2) , ORs are defined as the risks of direct or indirect 'losses resulting from inadequate or inappropriate internal processes, staff and systems or from external events'. The Basel definition of ORs includes a legal risk, in the form of activities that are not completely in accordance to the law, but excludes reputational and strategic risk (Work Group for Risk Management, 2006, p.8) . 1 The sources (causes) of banks' ORs can be the following:
• internal fraud
• external fraud
• business disruption and fall of information and other systems
• execution, delivery and process management
• damage to the physical assets
• employment practices and workplace safety
• clients, products and business practice.
Unlike the first Basel Accord (International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards or Basel I), Basel II addressed the capital requirements related to ORs. BCBS suggested a specific capital requirement regarding the ORs-related loss. The basic method for the quantification of this risk is given in the following part, whereby gross profit is taken as the approximation (proxy variable):
Required capital for ORs = Gross profit × Pondering factor.
In this context, gross profit average is taken for the last three years; net interest profit and net non-interest profit are summed up, excluding bad default burden and operating costs. In other words, bank's gross profit is defined as the interest-based net profit plus net profit not related to interest. The intention is that gross profit as the OR measure excludes the following (BCBS, 2005, p.141):
• any reservation (for default interest for example)
• operating costs, including provisions paid to entities for the services of external support (outsourcing)
• profit/loss related to selling securities in bank's trading book
• scheduled and non-scheduled items
• insurance related income.
The pondering factor (α) was specified by BCBS and its value is 15% or 0.15. This factor is equivalent to the assumption on the standard deviation of losses (σ) ascribed to operating factors equal to 2.5-10% of operating costs for a typical commercial bank and it increases minimum capital requirements by some 6-7%. Some estimates, however, suggest that the burden for 'safe' banks can be much higher (Frost, 2004, p.245) . This is the so-called basic indicator approach (BIA). Besides this, BCBS offered two additional approaches for calculating the required capital for ORs. One of them is a standardised approach (STA), in which banking activities are divided into eight business lines, after which the average gross profit in the last three years for every business line is multiplied by the 'beta factor' (β) and then added to other calculated amounts for determining the total capital for ORs (Table 1) . Another is advanced measurement approach (AMA), whereby the regulatory capital requests for ORs are calculated by bank's internal usage of qualitative and quantitative criteria. AMA is the only risk-sensitive approach; others are more arbitrary and shall not give proper motivation for OR reduction (Crouhy et al., 2006, p.336) . Agency services (β 6 ) 15
Asset management (β 7 ) 12
Retail brokerage (β 8 ) 12
Source: Hull (2007) While STA calculating the required capital in a given year, negative levels of the required capital for any business line (due to negative gross profit) can be compensated by positive amounts of the required capital for other business lines, without limitations. Therefore, national regulatory agencies are at liberty to apply more conservative treatment of the negative gross profit. In case the total amount of the required capital in a given year for all business lines is negative or zero, it should be excluded from the formula. BCBS specified several conditions that banks need to fulfil to use AMA. For example, one of the qualitative criteria is related to the internal system for OR evaluation to be firmly integrated into the processes of bank's risk management, on a daily basis. Bank needs to have such level of technology that allows the OR-based required level of capital to be allotted to main business lines but still to give motivation for the ORM improvement within a bank. Some of the most important quantitative criteria are given as follows (Đukić, 2007, p.166 ):
• According to the supervisory agency, bank is obliged to calculate the required level of regulatory capital as the sum of expected loss (EL) and unexpected loss (UL), unless it demonstrates the ability to properly include EL in internal business practices.
• Bank needs to have the OR evaluation system that is sufficiently 'granulated' to include the main drivers 2 of ORs that affect the form of the last part of the estimated loss value function, for the purpose of calculating minimum required regulatory capital.
To prevent the new global financial crisis, global financial regulators from 27 countries met BCBS representatives in Basel on 12 September, 2010, to discuss new banking requirements for capital. They decided to give their full support to the Agreement dated 26 July, 2010, known as Basel III. This new regulatory framework, whose gradual implementation is to be completed by the end of 2018, does not include the change of the existing level of capital adequacy (8%) but significantly changes the structure of the required capital (for example, the common equity capital ratio is to increase in the following years from 2 to as much as 7%). With regard to the OR, Basel III suggests a greater convergence in the measurement methodologies as well as a higher supervision (Feria-Domínguez et al., 2015) .
Decisions on minimum standards for managing ORs in banks in Bosnia and Herzegovina
The legal regulations and banking market in BiH has been polarised at the entity level. 2 Clearly defined clearances and responsibility lines in the process of exposure to ORs and ORM.
3 System that ensures that all bank employees are familiar with their duties in the ORM process.
4 System for regular reporting to the bank management regarding the ORM system functioning.
5 Obligatory periodic testing and the obligation of bank's management to analyse and evaluate at least once a year the adequacy of the established system for bank's ORM.
Bank is obliged to monitor the OR sources (such as inappropriate information system at the bank, illegal and inappropriate actions of bank's employees, external illegal activities, damage to the tangible assets resulting from the events that cannot be foreseen, etc.) by its organisational parts such as: business with the industry, business with financial institutions, business with citizens, agency services, payment transactions, asset management, retail brokerage, etc. Bank is required to provide daily safety copies (back-up) of electronic data on transactions made and book-keeping changes and to keep them in a safe reserve location. Also, bank is required to make the plan for emergency situations in written, aimed at providing constant work in case of serious disturbance in business operations caused by the situations that are out of bank's control and in case of malpractice, particularly by the employees with a high level of asset disposal and bank managing.
Bank needs to define the methods for internal registration of all losses by categories defined according to their sources and to establish a special database on all losses related to ORs. When OR-related losses become higher than 2% of bank's net capital, 3 bank is required to send a written notice to the FBA, not later than eight days after the overrun occurred.
Also, bank is obliged to form and maintain the MAKOR amount for potential losses based on exposure to ORs, by applying the following formula:
( ]
required minimum of capital for covering bank's exposure to ORs G BD :
annual gross profit made of net interest income and net non-interest income α:
15%, the factor defined by BCBS n:
number of years in the last 3-year period when profit was positive.
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For the purpose of calculating and reporting on the total value of its risk-pondered items, bank is obliged to make a special additional calculation of the pondered OR (POR) at least in such a way to multiply the MAKOR amount by 8.33, meaning by the reciprocal value of the minimum rate of the net capital. 5 When calculating the net capital rate (capital adequacy (FBA, 2003, pp.16-20; FBA, 2008) 6 bank is required to add the POR amount to the amount of pondered assets and credit equivalents risk and pondered market risk (PMR).
ORM process
The experiences showed that a successful implementation of an ORM framework and its related OR models within the entire bank requires eight key elements. They include adoption of a well-defined OR policy and identification of ORs based on the adopted terminology, construction of business process maps, creation of methodology for the best practice of OR measurement, provision of exposure management, installation of timely reporting, development of risk analysis tools (including stress-testing), and allotment of the economic capital as the OR function. These key elements are consistent with good practice for ORM that, according to BCBS 7 should be adopted by all banks, regardless of their size, sophistication level and nature of activities. These principles are summed up in Graph 1.
In total, bank's ORM as a process involves the following successive stages:
• identification
• evaluation (measurement)
• control (reduction)
• monitoring
• forming appropriate capital for covering OR exposure at the level of a bank as an entity.
The ORM process starts with their identification. Identification is a crucial stage in the ORM process since it needs to lead to a proactive instead of reactive influence on risks.
The aim of identification is to determine OR exposure and to document it. Each bank needs to identify the existing and potential largest or most important sources of ORs and needs to monitor 8 them by the activities in accordance to its own organisation (for example, business with the industry, business with citizens, agency services, etc.) to create a base of historically relevant data on ORs. 9 The process of creating a database for a successful evaluation of ORs is relatively long, due to the fact that at least 3-5 years is necessary for collecting all the relevant data. Appropriate identification and evaluation are the assumptions of the development of an efficient and sustainable system for OR control and monitoring. Specification of activities and/or events that may include exposure to ORs (activities and/or events that may cause ORs and losses) needs to be defined in detail and updated and coded for easier monitoring. OR identification needs to be done constantly and adapted to the changes at the bank and in the environment.
Graph 1 Eight key elements for achieving the best ORM practice
Source: Crouhy et al. (2006, p.328) .
A review of prior research
Because of the fact that bank ORM has been an inherent part of banks' everyday activities since the official implementation of Basel II, 31 December, 2006, the majority of the research has come from organisations like BCBS and nation-state bank supervisors, so that in current academic literature there are a limited number of papers. Of course, ORs have always been present in banks' activities and sometimes were the main cause of the banks fatal failures (e.g., Barings, exceptional loss caused by operational failure 1.4 billion USD; Société Générale, 5 billion EUR; UBS, 1,5 billion EUR, etc.); in other words, they are old as the banks are.
Amongst all different bank risk types, ORs can be the most devastating and the most difficult to predict. Therefore, previous academic papers regarding bank ORs are mainly focused on their estimation. Nikonov et al. (2013) describe an OR economic capital estimation model and its implementation in a large Russian bank. The model involves loss distribution approach (LDA) so that the bank's total losses are modelled through Monte-Carlo simulations of its four business units' losses. Also, it provides to fairly distributing the corresponding economic capital between business units so as to evaluate and manage their risk-adjusted performance. Li et al. (2009) analysed implications of the advanced measurement approach to estimate the OR, to which are exposed Chinese commercial banks. When modelling the severity of losses in a realistic manner, their preliminary tests indicate that classic distributions are unable to fit the entire range of OR data samples well. Because of that the authors propose so-called piecewise-defined severity distribution (PSD) that combines a parameter form for ordinary losses and a generalised Pareto distribution for large losses, and estimate OR by the loss distribution approach with Monte Carlo simulation. They compare the OR estimated with PSD-based LDA (PSD-LDA) with those obtained from the BIA, and the ratios of OR regulatory capital of some major international banks with those of Chinese commercial banks. The empirical results reveal the rationality and promise of application of the PSD-LDA for Chinese national commercial banks. In further research, Wang et al. (2012) develop so-called BS-PSD-LDA method, a loss distribution approach based on PSD and bootstrap sampling (i.e., a computer-based method that allows one to estimate almost any statistics of the sample distribution with great accuracy).
Moreover, Buch-Kromann et al. (2007) find that not all claims are reported when a database for financial OR is created. The probability of reporting increases with the size of the OR loss and converges towards one for large losses. Losses in OR have different causes and usually follow a wide spectrum of distributional shapes. Hence, a method for modelling OR based on one or two parametric models is deemed to fail. The authors introduce a semi-parametric method for modelling OR that is capable of taking under-reporting into account and being guided by prior knowledge of the distributional shape.
Besides, Viney (2005) conceptualises two distinct OR management modelspredictive and pre-emptive. The predictive model identifies a risk exposure within a current business environment, gathers information in relation to the operational and financial impact of that exposure, researches, and considers a range of risk management products and strategies, establishes management controls of authority, responsibility, reporting, systems, audit, and review, and then instigates the risk management strategy to achieve a determinable business outcome. The pre-emptive model adopts the components of the predictive model, but after that extends to a second phase that will be activated if a disruption to critical business functions occurs. In the event of a disaster the second phase of the model will recognise the risk event and assess the operational impact of the disaster on the organisation (i.e., bank). Internal and external communication systems will be activated to mobilise and inform necessary parties. Regarding to the documented business resumption plan developed in the first phase of the model, managers will prioritise the recovery of affected critical business functions and initiate pre-determined recovery strategies. The structured application of the business resumption plan will facilitate the timely recovery of normal business operations and minimise the operational and financial impacts of the disaster. Sturm (2013) studies the impact of operational losses on the reputation of European financial companies by examining the stock market reaction to information on operational loss events. He assesses cumulative abnormal returns around the date of the initial news paper and the settlement date of operational losses. Correcting for the impact of the loss amount allows for an analysis of damages to reputation due to operational losses. The analysis is based on a new dataset from a German data provider allowing for a specific focus on the European financial industry. Results show significant negative abnormal returns following first indications of the loss in the press. The negative stock market reaction to the announcement of settlement is somewhat more pronounced. Even after accounting for the direct financial impact of operational losses the author observes significant negative cumulative abnormal returns, providing evidence for the negative impact of operational losses on firm's reputation.
Case study: implementation of ORM process at BiH bank
The 'XYZ' bank (the name 'XYZ' is taken for the obligation to keep the business secret), a small domestic bank, started the implementation of the ORM process as late as in 2009, while its competitors, larger banks that are branch offices of larger European banks, joined the process two years earlier, pursuant to the instructions given by their parent banks. At the very start, the bank faced the problem of how to identify OR exposure.
Possible approaches to ORs identification, with special reference to the identification based on their taxonomy
Pursuant to BCBS recommendations, there are four possible approaches to identification, as follows (BCBS, 2003):
• risk mapping (risk differentiation)
• risk indicators
• measurement
• self-evaluation regarding the catalogue of potential exposure to ORs (identification based on the OR taxonomy).
Risk mapping is a process implemented through all organisational units of the bank to obtain the information on risk exposure of these units, risk type and level. The result of quantitative mapping of risk is the so-called probability-impact diagram, which is a typical diagram of EL frequency in relation to the influence for every type of risky event of business line.
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Risk indicators are statistical and/or metrical data, very often financial, which indicate the risk profile of every organisational unit (activity) and bank as a whole. Such indicators include: number of unauthorised credit card transactions, number of clients' complaints, turnover rate per employee, frequency and/or influence of errors and failures in transaction processing, insurance premiums, number of failed trade transactions, etc. Indicators should actually be simple measures since they are frequently defined on a daily basis, and they would also need to be risk sensitive.
Some banks measure their exposure to ORs by using, for example, the data related to historic losses, or they combine such data to the external data on losses, case scenario analyses, and factors for risk evaluation. One efficient way for the data (information) to be used properly is to establish the system for monitoring and registering the frequency and effect of individual cases of operational losses and other relevant data on such data.
The most frequently used approach to the identification of ORs is their identification based on the taxonomy made by the bank itself. The starting point is the division of bank as an organisation into units to obtain better evaluation and better perspective of all the OR aspects. The OR identification can be made according to (Crouhy et al., 2006 ):
• business lines
• corporate finance
• trading and sales
• retail banking
• commercial banking
• payment and settlement
• agency services
• asset management
• retail brokerage
• activities that include exposure to ORs (the so-called granulated mapping of ORs)
• internal fraud -deliberate activities or failures of at least one person that works for the bank or at the bank for one's own (economic) benefit
• external fraud -intentional and malicious activities of third parties towards bank, in terms of deceit, abuse and/or avoidance of law, regulations, rules, and policies of the bank
• employment practices and workplace safety -potential losses due to the lack of implementation (violation) of labour act and other regulations related to work, employment, healthcare and social protection and safety at work
• clients, products and business practice -potential losses due to unintentional (negligent) failures in providing professional services towards clients and/or due to the nature (structure) of product/service
• damage to physical assets -possible damage to physical assets (business facilities, infrastructure, etc.) and human losses caused by natural disasters and other events
• business disruption and system failures -potential losses due to inadequacy, inefficiency, bad functioning or failure of bank's IT system and/or system of public/outsourcing/information (providers)
• execution, delivery and process management -possible losses due to unintentional errors in management processes and/or support (including the relations with business partners, clients and providers) and/or
• cause types
• people
• processing
• systems
• external causes.
For illustration, Table 2 includes the percentages of operational losses by business lines and event types. All losses exceed $1 million, are related to the USA and were collected by OpVantage.
11 Table 2 Empirical data on operational losses
Business line % of all losses Event type % of all losses
Corporate finance 4% Internal fraud 27% 
Retail brokerage 22%
Source: Manić (2007, pp.16-17) It is evident that the business line with most observations is retail banking (39% of all the losses), while the most frequent type of events is related to clients, products and business practice (48.1% of all events). However, it is not necessary that the most frequent business line (or event type) also has the losses with the highest influence on the amount of money lost. It is much more often that the most frequent OR losses are those of low and medium size, while rare OR losses are usually high. In accordance to that, Allen and Bali (2007) suggest that a bank's OR is more likely to be the cause of a large unexpected catastrophic loss than market-wide risk, although when a loss occurs, it is smaller, on average, than those resulting from a combination of market risk, credit risk or other risk events. Furthermore, Dorogovs et al. (2013) find that internal information steeling and misusing have become one of the most important factors affecting ORM and control in financial institutions. Currently, large part of risk management activities, particularly in all types of financial institutions, is focused exactly on preventing and combating internal fraud incidents and cases.
Besides, research of Wang and Hsu (2013) suggests that board size is negatively and non-linearly associated with the possibility of OR events. For the event types of 'clients, products, and business practices' and 'internal fraud and external fraud' financial institutions with a higher proportion of independent directors are less likely to suffer from fraud or failure to comply with professional obligations to clients. The results on age and tenure heterogeneity also indicate that having a more diverse board can have an adverse impact on the board monitoring function.
The widest framework for OR identification is given by their Basel definition ("loss risks that are the result of inadequate or inappropriate internal processes, staff and systems, or external events"). For example, due to the very nature of ORs, BCBS left the option for every bank to change the OR definition in accordance to its individual characteristics. Therefore, Basel definition can be modified and expanded.
The result of identification comes in the form of the matrix giving detailed description of OR presence in various activities, processes or organisational units of the bank. The matrix of events that include exposure to ORs, which is the most appropriate one, is an integral part of Annex 9 of Basel II.
There are several different forms of self-evaluation or identification based on the taxonomy of events that include exposure to ORs. A proper formal framework for identifying ORs is in the form of the so-called checklist, where the employees in charge within every organisational unit or business line answer a set of questions. Checklists basically include closed-ended questions that require a positive or negative answer (yes/no questions). In developed countries, various types of checklists are published by specialised organisations for risk management as well as the organisations that prepare checklists tailored for individual activities (for example, International Risk Management Institute -IRMI, US Management Association -AMA, etc.). 12 The efficiency of using checklists in identification of risk exposure depends primarily on the skill of a used. Good risk managers use prepared checklists as the basis for expanding the questionnaire by additional questions that were not previously made. For them, questionnaire is actually the inspiration for new questions. For example, if the answer to the prepared question whether bank has armoured door was negative, it could lead to additional questions that can be used for determining that bank has a much better system for protection against theft (such as specialised alarm systems) than armoured door.
The creation of a comprehensive checklist is a complex task and demands full involvement in its implementation. The example of OR checklist related to internal fraud at the 'XYZ' bank is given in Table 3 . It is evident that one of disadvantages of self-evaluation by means of checklists is a relatively high subjective result. To avoid this, more people usually create checklists and later verify the results. Another form of self-evaluation is workshops that are generally led by experts or independent professional. At workshops that are, such as checklists, individually implemented for every organisational unit, the employees in charge discuss risk exposure, control and activities that should be taken for the protection against risks.
Self-evaluation is usually used as a first step for those banks that are just starting to evaluate their exposure to ORs, such is the case with the 'XYZ' bank. The internal database on the events that bear exposure to ORs is still not formed so that self-evaluation is the only approach that can give the basic or initial perspective on ORs. Table 3 Checklist for internal frauds at 'XYZ' bank Table 3 Checklist for internal frauds at 'XYZ' bank (continued) 
OR evaluation in the function of calculating regulatory and economic capital
The 'XYZ' bank's MAKOR at the end of 2013 was BAM 482,000 while POR was BAM 4,015,000. However, the approach of basic indicator is only a proxy of the real exposure of the bank to ORs. This is confirmed by the report presented in Table 4 , created after the checklists for all seven sources of ORs as stipulated by Basel II were filled in by the employees in all Bank's departments (accountancy, plan and analysis, retail banking, legal and personnel, payment and settlement, and credit). In fact, POR is no longer BAM 4,015,000 as a result of pure approximation of MAKOR x reciprocal value of the capital adequacy ratio, but BAM 2,594,950 as the result of the real bank's exposure to a wide spectrum of ORs in all organisational units of the bank and it is by some 35.37% lower. Table 4 Summary report of 'XYZ' bank on monitoring and internal measuring of ORs for 2013
In BAM Since the capital adequacy ratio in BiH is calculated by the formula:
Category of OR
( )
Capital adequacy ratio = Total capital / Pondered credit risk + Pondered market risk + Pondered OR 12%, ≥ whereby the decision on minimum standards for managing market risks at bank (due to the global financial crisis and later recession) was suspended in both entities, the conclusion is that the capital adequacy of the banks in BiH is mostly affected by credit (which is completely understanding) and ORs. This was a simplified illustration of the importance of managing ORs and in particular of the development of internal methodology for registering and monitoring ORs. It is a constant process further conditioned by the fact that the banking regulators in BiH (FBA and ABRS), strongly influenced by the coordinators of supervision of the Central Bank of BiH, (which has been a member of the Bank for International Settlement since 11 June, 2001 ), aim at the gradual implementation of advanced, internal methodology (AMA).
Generally speaking, domestic banks in BiH have made limited progress in quantifying their ORs, despite the fact that all BiH banks are basically obliged to have reported operational losses since the end of 2008. On the contrary, those BiH, who are actually affiliations of large European banks, applied ORM from the beginning of 2007 and their parent banks gave them concrete guidelines and decision support systems (e.g., IT systems) for improving their ORM. Hence, there is a gap between domestic and non-domestic BiH banks.
As the research of Mitra et al. (2015) shows ORs are dependent on the level of market development (specifically emerging or developed). OR is higher in emerging markets than in developed markets, regardless of industry sector, and so investment in decision support systems (although ORs can arise from a range of sources, such systems directly impact ORs) should aim to reduce ORs.
Options for OR avoidance and insurance
One important factor separates ORs from market and credit risks. In making decisions on risk-return profile, banks often expect to earn a higher level of return on their capital by assuming higher market or credit risks. However, generally speaking, bank cannot presume higher expected return by assuming higher ORs; ORs destroy the value for all the stakeholders.
This might suggest that banks should always try to minimise or avoid ORs. However, the attempts for reducing the exposure to ORs are rather costly. For example, bank can introduce better IT systems with safer technology and an up-to-date backup system. But this investment into new technology certainly costs millions of even tens of millions of US dollars. Thus, should bank spend this money for reducing its exposure to ORs? Very often, a simple answer to this question does not exist. Banks increasingly take into account RBC cost when assessing their decisions on OR avoidance. They also compare economic benefits and costs of various types of risk avoidance, from investing into IT systems to insurance.
Well-known banks in the USA start developing the ways for measuring ORs. They make insurance contracts so as to avoid the effects of OR key events. It is a common thing for bank to buy insurance for its protection against large individual losses that may be a result of employees' indecent activities (fictitious loans or unauthorised activities for example), thefts and frauds, various forms of cybercrime, etc. Insurance against low-probability but high severe losses is available via insurance contract including a special purpose vehicle (SPE), known in insurance as "Financial institution bond and computer crime policy". There are also other policies available on the insurance market for disaster-caused exposure related to law suits (due to failure to fulfil obligations or negligence) and for destruction of the property resulting from major disaster (such as fires or earthquakes).
Basically, insurance is a mechanism for collecting and transferring usual exposure to loss within the banking industry or economy. The existence of insurance for specific risks depends on the ability of insurer or a group of insurers to generate a sufficient level of premium and on appropriate risk dispersion to 'create the market' and enable them take over the risks of others. This also depends on the extent to which insurers is capable of avoiding the problem of moral hazard, which means that insurers must be certain that the institutions insured keep high interest to prevent any costly event. Consequently, the usual limits per loss event for large institutions are 500-600 million USD and banks often need to pay the 'first loss' amount (i.e., franchise) on the insured ORs.
Also, there remains the danger of insurance company not being able to pay the bank the insured amount in case of the insured OR event. The total bank's methodology of measuring and managing ORs needs to encompass, in the form of discount of insurance premium decrease, residual risks such as the remaining period of insurance policy (for example, less than one year), chances of policy being cancelled or not reduced, uncertain payment, etc.
In Basel II, BCBS provides the banks that use AMA approaches with the possibility to decrease the use of their capital for ORs by 20%, owing to OR avoidance by means of insurance. Certainly, insurance cannot provide a complete response to the OR issue, but it is a weapon in the arsenal that needs to include obliging to the best practice of internal control, OR measurement and RBC (Crouhy et al., 2006, pp.343-344) .
Concluding remarks
The first and crucial stage in bank's ORM process is their identification. The more ORs are identified the more prepared bank is to respond and deal with OR occurrence or to prevent the conditions likely to result in ORs invasion. Proper identification does not only enable appropriate control but also efficient OR monitoring. The most appropriate tool for the identification of ORs for a bank that just starts its ORM process is OR self-evaluation in terms of the catalogue (list) of all potential exposures to ORs. In other words, this is a creation of appropriate checklists of ORs based on the taxonomy of events which include potential exposure to ORs and losses and their filling by employees in charge at banks individual organisational units.
The issue of OR importance at banks is unquestionable, especially since the September 11 terrorist attacks on WTO towers in New York in 2001. Many companies closed down due to business data loss, while many others with nearby offices suffered significant financial losses due to the fact that their data were not saved on other locations and they were prevented by the police to reach their offices for seven days. The question is the extent to which one should pursue the evaluation of these risks, and consequently, allocate minimum adequate capital for covering exposure to such losses. For example, the banks in BiH Federation are required to send a written notice to the FBA in case the OR losses exceed 2% of their net capital; the banks in Serbia need to inform the National Bank of Serbia if the losses resulting from ORs and those that can occur in such a way exceed 1% of bank's capital; while BCBS does not precisely define the minimum amount.
The OR evaluation is certainly important, but it is still in progress at the level of the global banking sector. Besides identifying, evaluating, controlling, monitoring and forming RBC, appropriate ORM is 'the partnership' amongst business units, infrastructure units and corporate management units such as internal revision and risk management.
Since OR is still young comparing to credit and market risk, data availability on OR is limited. Consequently, empirical research on OR is still hindered by the lack of data. This paper provides an evaluation of ORs for a subject BiH bank, which has recently started to implement ORM, and show the importance of adequate beginning of the implementation as well as the intention to reach a developed approach to ORs. The bank can serve as an example of typical domestic bank in an emerging country economy like BiH.
Provided the necessary data is available, further research may refer to a comparison between two or more domestic banks and the problems they facing in the process of managing of ORs in at least two different emerging market countries and/or scrutinise the progress in the ORM of a bank, from BIA to AMA, with the emphasise on the changing of the adequate RBC.
